A recent Maryland Supreme Court ruling in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Jamie Wallace has implications for local government liability. Parks with sidewalks or pathways that constitute a thruway for transportation purposes may not afford governmental immunity as granted by the Maryland Recreational Use Statute.
In a recent MD Supreme Court opinion the justices sided with plaintiff Jamie Wallace clarifying local government liability in the case of Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Jamie Wallace. Published on July 17, the unanimous opinion held that the the liability protections afforded to local governments by the Maryland Recreational Use Statute (MRUS) do not apply if areas of the park are used for transportation. Therefore the judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the City was not protected by the Recreational Use Statute in this instance.
The claim arose from an incident where an individual was riding a bicycle on the Inner Harbor Promenade. Their tire became wedged between the sidewalk bricks and the bulkhead which caused an accident leading to multiple injuries. The individual sued the City on the grounds that they have a duty of care to warn users of the gap in the sidewalk. The City contended that the promenade is part of the Inner Harbor Park and therefore they have immunity from that duty as granted by the MRUS as outlined below.
§5–1103.
Except as specifically recognized by or provided in § 5-1106 of this subtitle, an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational or educational purpose, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on the premises to any person who enters on the land for these purposes.
In reviewing the case the justices concluded that while the promenade is part of the Inner Harbor Park, the City had also incorporated it into the transportation infrastructure, which negated the immunity granted under the MRUS thus altering the governments responsibility to warn of danger. The justices echoed the appeals court in pointing out that the City’s establishment of the Waterfront Management District in 2007 and adoption of the City’s Bicycle Master Plan in 2006 changed the nature of the promenade. From the opinion:
Applying the foregoing principles here, we hold that the Recreational Use Statute does not protect local governments from common law liability when the government has made property available for transportation purposes as part of its public infrastructure, even when a permitted use within that transportation infrastructure—such as biking—also constitutes a recreational activity. This is not to say that a formal incorporation of the property into the transportation infrastructure is the only way a local government could render the Recreational Use Statute inapplicable. But because it did so here, the City established a right of access independent from any recreational invitation, and thus assumed the corresponding common law duties associated with that right. The Recreational Use Statute, therefore, does not apply here.
